

Experience, Other, Body and Life - On Nishida Kitaro's Phenomenological Philosophy

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論 文 内 容 の 要 旨

The aim of this dissertation is to identify and consider some phenomenological elements, actual and potential, in Nishida's philosophy. My central thesis is that his thought has significant phenomenological aspects. The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I is an introduction to Nishida's philosophy in general. In Part II I discuss four main issues into which he shows distinctively phenomenological insights, i.e. experience, other, body and life. Part III is a conclusion on the potentials and limits of his phenomenological philosophy.

I Introduction

1. Nishida's Philosophy and Japanese Philosophy

In this chapter, I elucidate the nature of Nishida's philosophy by considering his relations to Japanese culture and to Japanese philosophy. I claim that Nishida's philosophy is neither Western nor Eastern; rather, it is to overcome the dichotomy of the West and the East. In Japan before Nishida, philosophy had been regarded as an import from the West. This is why Nakae Chōmin curiously asserted that there had been no philosophy in Japan.

Meanwhile, Japanese engagement in philosophy acquired a connotation in the context of international politics, to the effect that Japanese was leaving Asia for the West. Indeed, Japanese philosophy had a double significance. On the one hand, it was part of the project of Westernisation. On the other hand, it was something "original" which could supersede the predominant Western culture. In this latter sense, "Japanese philosophy" was not merely a newly attached sub-division of Western philosophy, but a spiritual activity capable of solving problems in the contemporary world. Now a variety of traditional Japanese cultures had influence upon the making of Japanese philosophy. This circumstance prompted Nishida to reflect upon the essence of Japanese culture. He claimed that the task of Japanese culture was not to Westernise (or Easternise) Japan, but to globalise it, that is to say, to open it to the world. For him, the project of globalising Japan consisted in seeing how elements of Japanese culture could contribute to the future of world history. However, he believed that Japan was to become the global leader, or at least the leader of the East Asia. This led him to theoretically justifying the disastrous nationalistic movement. He could have kept distance from ultra-nationalism by virtue of the spirit of globalisation, but he ended up Japanising philosophy. His thought is usually associated with the philosophy of nothingness. However, his philosophy has its sources not only in Zen Buddhism, but also in Confucianism, Daoism, and even Christianity. 'Person', 'love' and 'god' are among the keywords in Nishida. He found valuable insights in both Eastern and Western religions. Although his philosophy may include a philosophy of religion, it is not itself a religion. It would be an oversimplification to identify his philosophy as a whole as a philosophy of religion. He philosophised on different issues, and religion is one of them. What is in need is an adequate apparatus for interpreting his thought, which reduces it neither to a philosophy of religion nor to a philosophy of nothingness. I suggest that we should read Nishida phenomenologically. Thereby we can complete the globalisation of his philosophy.

2. Nishida's Philosophy and Phenomenology

In this chapter, I make preliminary remarks on phenomenological aspects of Nishida's philosophy. To understand Nishida correctly, we should not speak about "Nishidan philosophy" or see the canon of a school in his texts, since we would lose sight of flexible and dynamic movements of his thought. Nor do I engage in a comparative study between Nishida's philosophy and phenomenology. In fact, Nishida never called himself a phenomenologist; there is no stage at which Nishida's locution was ostensibly phenomenological. But Nishida was not speaking a private language, either. Some of his concepts turn out be congenial to phenomenological ones. Besides, he was well aware of the trend of phenomenology. Indeed, he read works by Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger. Unlike other Japanese scholars such as Kuki Shūzō and Takahashi Satomi who studied phenomenology in Europe, though, Nishida was never involved directly in the phenomenological movement. In addition, it may seem that Nishida failed to distinguish phenomenology from other philosophical schools. One may even argue that Nishida's philosophy is too dialectical to be phenomenological. We should note, however, that Nishida's philosophy shares with phenomenology two fundamental orientations: anti-reductionism and anti-dualism. Nishida's philosophy, analogously to phenomenology, is a third position that criticises oppositions of pairs of positions, such as: materialism and spiritualism, analogy theory and empathy theory, intellectualism and mysticism, and mechanism and vitalism. Reading Nishida's philosophy as a third position is not simply to search for similarities between Nishida and phenomenology, but to interpret his philosophy by a phenomenological method, in order to explore hidden possibilities in his philosophy. One may challenge that Nishida's philosophy

has no theory of evidence, *epoché* or reduction. It is neither a "descriptive psychology" nor a "transcendental philosophy;" rather, it is all too "speculative." Although Nishida's philosophy and phenomenology have a common point of departure in the justification of direct experience, he was never a phenomenologist of experience. In fact, he criticised the approach of the experience in the investigations of other, body and life. His philosophy can be regarded not only as a philosophical phenomenology, but also as an applied phenomenology, in particular when read from the viewpoint of phenomenological psychiatry. The study of Nishida's phenomenological philosophy opens up the new possibility to understand his philosophy without the presuppositions from a dogmatic school or a religious background.

II On the Phenomenological Elements in Nishida's Philosophy

3. Experience

In this chapter, I discuss Nishida's conceptions of pure experience, self-awakening and place. Nishida begins his philosophy with the concept of pure experience. He suggests that pure experience does not presuppose the dichotomy of subject and object. Rather, pure experience is in the state where subject and object have not differentiated. This is the ultimate direct experience, in which there is no medium, objectification, judgement, etc. Nishida's position of pure experience can be understood as a monism, for he claims that pure experience is the only reality. The philosophy of pure experience can be understood as a phenomenological philosophy of the concrete immediate experience. Nishida's notion of pure experience is phenomenological – but I do not intend to compare his thought and phenomenology. My claim is rather that his philosophy of pure experience can be read phenomenologically. His philosophy of experience is not directly derived from Husserl's phenomenology of experience, but from the influences of phenomenalism in late 19th century. In fact, the very notion of "pure experience" is not Nishida's original concept, but we can identify two predecessors: Ernst Mach and William James. Nishida's philosophy of pure experience is phenomenological, in the sense that pure experience is a presupposition-less direct experience, so that the philosophy based on this notion goes against all philosophical dualisms such as dualisms of subject and object, body and mind, and materialism and spiritualism. His philosophy can be refined as a radical philosophy of immediate experience, which is related to the way how we see and think. For him, the acts of seeing and thinking can be explained by pure experience, which is the pre-reflective state where subject and object are not yet constituted. The notion of experience is similar to the approach of phenomenology, which puts the "subject-object" way of seeing the world into bracket. Nishida and Husserl share a common starting point on experience - it is directedness, intuitiveness and givenness. Nishida's philosophy of pure experience suggests a philosophical method. This method is supported by a philosophical attitude, which can be understood as a phenomenological one. His notion of pure experience is distinct from the empiricists' notion of experience. Rather, he questions the fundamental ground of sensational seeing and hearing on one hand, as well as intellectual thinking on the other. The philosophy of pure experience is a position similar to the motto of phenomenology: *Zu den Sachen Selbst!* However, Nishida would say his position is "to return to the direct experience before any reflection or analysis." He later abandons his philosophy on the standpoint of experience because of its psychologism. Struggling to find a solution in the philosophy of pure experience, he develops the philosophy of self-awakening. Unlike the common psychological notion of self-consciousness, his notion

of self-awakening is not about the intentionality of the consciousness but about "a self that sees itself in itself." He also develops a philosophy of place, which can be understood as a "logic of predicate." One may challenge that the philosophy of place is not a phenomenology but a metaphysic or ontology. However, the philosophy of place can be regarded as a critique of the subject-biased phenomenology of consciousness. Nishida's concept of self-awakening and place is no longer based on experience, for he notices the limitations in the philosophy of experience.

4. Other

In this chapter, I discuss the problem of the person, theory of analogy and theory of empathy, and Nishida's philosophy of sympathy. The problem of the other is a difficult philosophical problem. Nishida's approach is not to see how I can experience the other, but to question the ground between I and you. Nishida's philosophy of I and you can be seen as a personalism: it is neither the approach of analogy nor empathy, but a phenomenology of sympathy. What is the meaning of person in Nishida's philosophy? Personal self is an important concept in Nishida's philosophy. For Nishida, I and you are personal beings. He does not use pure experience or self-awakening to explain the relationship between I and you. It is because pure experience and self-awakening have a tendency of returning to a primary self or a transcendental consciousness, which may lead to the problem of philosophical solipsism. For Nishida, the personhood of a being is not grasped from the outside of the person, but it is simply the ground or place that is inside the personal self. In fact, Nishida's concept of place refers to an underlying principle or the ground for personal beings. The logic of place is one of the most important concepts in Nishida's philosophy, but he was not satisfied with the philosophy of I and you. Nishida tries to develop a philosophy of sympathy, which can explain the personal relationship in our social and historical world. Nishida's philosophy of I and you can be understood as a phenomenology of sympathy, in particular in the light of Scheler's phenomenological analysis on sympathy. Sympathy is a sophisticated concept with many different meanings. Nishida questioned the ground of the feeling of sympathy. For example, he mentioned the sympathetical feelings between mother and child. It seems that Nishida mixed the concept of sympathising and knowing, but still he questions the nature of sympathy in a Schelerian way: Where should we find the ground of sympathy, in which we are happy with other's happiness, and are sad with other's sadness? It would be interesting to see Nishida develop a phenomenology of other, following Scheler's insights that even though I do not know the other, I can feel the same way with the other. It is phenomenologically evident that two persons can feel the same feeling. Here, "phenomenologically" is not referred to the transcendental phenomenology of subjectivity, but the phenomenology of feelings: it is impossible to know the other by means of analogy only, but it is also not the case of knowing the other by any means of empathy. Only by the act of sympathy, I can recognise you by seeing you inside me, while you can recognise me by seeing me inside you. The phenomenon of sympathy is evident in one person in love with another, but not in a person trying to know the other. Nishida's philosophy of person is phenomenological: his approach to the problem of the other is neither a theory of analogy nor of empathy, but it can be understood as a phenomenology of sympathy.

5. Body

In this chapter, I discuss Nishida's philosophy of acting intuition, rhythm and situatedness. Pure experience was the starting point of Nishida's early philosophy, but he self-criticised the position of experience. In his later philosophy, the keyword was no longer 'experience', but 'acting'. It is neither "I think therefore I am" nor "I will therefore I am," but "I act therefore I am." As the organ of acting intuition, body is one of the most important philosophical concepts in Nishida's later philosophy. Acting intuition is useful in the explanation of body technique, which should not be reduced into one-sided intellectualism or mysticism. I interpret the philosophy of acting intuition as a phenomenology of rhythm. Nishida only mentioned the word 'rhythm' a few times in his works, and he claimed that Japanese culture is rhythmical. For him, Japanese culture is neither rational nor emotional, but a third position that being neither mechanism nor finalism. He does not define clearly what rhythm is, but we can see that the phenomenon of rhythm is a living flow, which is similar to the phenomenon of time. When I am listening to a melody, my ears do not just receive an aggregate of individual notes, but my body grasps the rhythm as a whole. Rhythm is neither a thing in the music, nor a thing in our inner consciousness; rather, it is in our body. The embodiment of rhythm should not be restricted to musical experience, but it is also found in our bodily actions. To be rhythmical is not to eat mechanically or mystically, but to act by becoming the thing. One cannot be rhythmical by thinking alone, but one has to train the body in rhythm. In the case of using tools, one cannot become a master without training the body rhythmically. With an emphasis on breathing, repetitive exercises have an important role in making a rhythmical body. Phenomenology of rhythm is related to Nishida's philosophy of acting intuition. But one may argue that it is not a phenomenology, for he did not study the problem of rhythm with a phenomenological method. However, his philosophy of body is phenomenological, in the sense that it does not reduce the body to a mere machine. I shall argue that acting intuition can be understood as a situated action. Situated action is not a philosophical concept, but is from the theory of situatedness in cognitive science. I interpret acting intuition as a third position based on the situatedness in our historical world. Like the concept of situated action, acting intuition is a philosophical position that is anti-intellectualism. The later development of Nishida's philosophy shifts from experience to a socially and historically oriented dimension. The world where we are experiencing and acting is not an imaginary world, but a world that is social and historical. Nishida does not use the word "situation" in his philosophy. However, we can see that he has a similar word: "foothold." Without this foothold or ground, a person will not be able to act in the concrete world. In this sense, to become the thing is an acting intuition, which is always *in situ*. Seen as a phenomenology of situatedness, acting intuition is a philosophical position abridging cognitive science on one hand, and the phenomenology of action on the other.

6. Life

In this chapter, I discuss Nishida's philosophy of "life" and "to live," life and logic, and the phenomenology of life. His philosophy of life is not only concerned with the concept of "life," but also with the act of "living." He never thought that philosophy should be separated from our actual life. He emphasises that philosophy is ultimately for the benefit of life. In this sense, life is the most important concept in his late philosophy. He was influenced by J. S. Haldane's notion of active maintenance. Life is understood neither by mechanism nor vitalism, but from the viewpoint of a bio-environmental theory. Although Nishida's philosophy of life is undoubtedly influenced by

Haldane, it is also related to his philosophical position of acting intuition. Nishida's philosophy of life does not concern only our biological life, but is also related to our historical life. For him, there is a "logic" concerning life and death. The ultimate self-awakening is the awareness of the relationship of life and death. For Nishida, true life includes life and death; life without death is unconceivable. It should be noticed that the aim of his philosophy of life is not only to develop a theoretical philosophy of life, but also to develop a practical philosophy to deal with the problem of life and death. Nishida's view on life and death is related to his "logic" of dialectical thinking. For him, life is always related to its opposite. He argues that life always includes sickness and death. The significance of his "logic" of life consists in its explanation of our historical world. His philosophy of life is not an "ism," which has no historical contents at all. He believed that life can be grasped in a "logical" manner. He tried to develop a philosophy of life with the so-called "logic." His philosophy of life implies a criticism of both a one-sided mechanism and such a vitalism. His philosophy of life can be understood as a phenomenology of life: it does not fall into an extreme reductionalism. His notion of the world of historical life can be understood as a philosophy of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*). His philosophy of life is a phenomenology of everydayness, which is a third position to overcome the objective scientific view of life on the one hand, and the subjective philosophy of life on the other.

III Conclusion

7. Potentials and Limits of Nishida's Phenomenological Philosophy

We do not characterize Nishida's philosophy as phenomenological to assimilate it to an established "school," but to reveal a distinctive kind of concern in his thoughts. Phenomenology is not a school, but an open way of practicing philosophy. Nishida's phenomenological philosophy can be understood as a third position in different contexts: beyond materialism and spiritualism, beyond mechanism and vitalism, beyond life and death, beyond East and West, and even beyond good and evil. But some may want to characterize his position as monistic, and others as pluralistic. For a monistic interpretation, one may cite one of his early notions, "pure experience." This notion is phenomenological in a certain sense, especially in its opposition to philosophical dualism; but the metaphysical position of "monism of pure experience" may cause theoretical difficulties to develop itself as a phenomenological philosophy. For a pluralistic interpretation, one may cite Nishida's interest in Leibniz's monadology. However, Nishida's position is essentially different from Leibniz's pluralism. And even though in his late period he adopted an apparently social-historical approach to the problems of the other, body and life, he had no intention to develop a pluralistic philosophy. Especially, his position on Japanese culture was not a cultural pluralism; rather, he tried to link up Japan and the world. His view of Japanese culture harmonizes with his philosophy. His philosophy can be regarded as a Japanese philosophy that can overcome philosophical problems in, and derived from, the West. It is neither an Easternised nor Westernised philosophy, but a philosophy that may give a challenge to the modern notion of the ahistorical Cartesian self, and to return to the historical reality that can be understood in the ordinary language and the life-world. Nishida calls his theory "radical objectivism." His philosophy is beyond monism and pluralism, in the sense that it is under the "logic of one and many." Critics have found, however, his "logic" problematic. His philosophy can be seen as a postmodern philosophy, for it is against dualism in modern philosophy. As a third position, his philosophy is quite consistent. However, I notice one weakness with his philosophy: it overemphasises the logic of life, and underemphasises the ethics of life.

Nishida's philosophy fails to answer to ethical questions such as: why killing is evil, and how we can overcome evil inherent in our human nature. It turns to be the weakest point in his phenomenological philosophy. Today, the most fundamental task regarding Japanese philosophy, including his philosophy, is neither to attack nor to defend it as a school, but to rethink critically philosophical thoughts of Japanese philosophers, and unfold their potentials.

論文審査結果の要旨

本論文は、近代日本を代表する哲学者西田幾多郎の哲学的達成を現象学的哲学という観点から解明し、それを「日本的独自性」においてではなく、「世界的普遍性」において評価し直そうと試みたものである。論者は西田の哲学に内在する現象学的エレメントとして「経験」「他者」「身体」「生命」という4つの鍵概念を取り出し、それぞれの問題領域において、西田の哲学が、西洋哲学の流れを貫いてきた伝統的二項対立、すなわち主観と客観、自己と他者、精神と身体、機械論と生氣論などに見られる相克を調停し、「第三の立場」を提唱したものであることを明らかにする。本論文は西田の哲学的発展を独自の視点から再構成し、それを現象学運動の展開と交差させることによって、従来の西田哲学研究には見られなかった新たな論点を付け加え、西田哲学の今日的意義とその潜在的可能性を闡明するものとなっている。

本論文は第Ⅰ部「序論」(第1～2章)、第Ⅱ部「西田の現象学的哲学」(第3～6章)、および第Ⅲ部「結論」(第7章)から成る。

第1章「西田の哲学と日本的哲学」においては、明治期以来の日本への西洋哲学の移入の過程とその問題点が、レーヴィットやヘリゲルの論述を手がかりに簡潔にたどり直される。同時に西田の日本文化論およびその根底にある「無」の概念が俎上に乗せられ、それらが過度に「日本的独自性」の観点から解釈されたために、戦時期に西田哲学が「国体」や「皇道」の正当化に用いられたことが指摘される。論者によれば、その過ちを繰り返さないためには、西田の哲学を日本主義的に解釈するのではなく、その方法を世界的普遍性において理解することが必要なのである。(なお、論者は「西田哲学」という呼称がすでに一定の解釈(たとえば京都学派)を前提していることから、それを避けて「西田の哲学」という呼称を一貫して用いている。)

第2章「西田の哲学と現象学」では、西田自身が「現象学」に対してネガティブな態度を取っていたにもかかわらず、西田の哲学が現象学的読解を許容するものである所以が明らかにされる。論者は西田の哲学と現象学との関係について、小川侃、大橋良介、J. マラルド、A. フィーンバーグ、新田義弘、野家啓一らの先行研究を検討しつつ、西田の哲学が開かれた方法論としての広義の現象学運動の中に位置づけることを主張する。その理由は、両者の間には(1)直接経験の明証性から出発すること、(2)歴史的実在の世界の中に知覚や思考を基礎づけること、(3)主観と客観の二分法を拒絶すること、(4)自己そのものの記述を試みたこと、などの共通基盤が認められ、また西田の現象学批判は、むしろ彼自身の立場に対する自己批判でもあったからである。

第3章「経験」では、西田の哲学的出発点である「純粹経験」の概念が検討され、そこから「自覚」や、さらには「場所」へと発展する思索の過程がたどられる。西田の「純粹経験」は、直接的経験の第一次性を強調することにおいて現象学的であり、同時にそれは思考、意志、知的直観などの基盤である「唯一の実在」と見なされることにより、主知主義と主意主義とを超える「第三の立場」が形成される。次いでそれは、フィヒテの事行やロイスの自己表現的体系に依拠した「自覚」の立場へと深められ、やがて「場所」の

概念となって結実する。「場所」は自己意識の反省にとどまらず、自己言及的自己を掘り下げる「自覚」の終わりのなきプロセスと結びついた存在論的概念なのである。

第4章「他者」において論者は西田の論文「私と汝」を主題的に取り上げ、その基軸となっている「人格(person)」概念を精査する。西田においては人格的自己としての私と汝が「場所」という媒介面(M)で出遭うことを通じて結びついているのであり、それが独我論を克服する方途ともなっていることを指摘する。さらに論者は、西田が他我問題の考察において類推説と感情移入説をともに退けている点に着目し、それをシェーラーの共同感情の現象学と対比することを試みる。それによれば、西田は感情移入(empathy)と共同感情(sympathy)とを区別し損ねているのであり、シェーラーの議論を踏まえるならば、西田の人格をめぐる考察は、むしろ根源的な意味での共同感情論として、現象学の観点から評価し直されるべきなのである。

第5章「身体」では、後期西田哲学の基礎概念である「行為的直観」の解明が目指される。後期の西田にとって、人間はデカルト的な「考える自己」ではなく身体によって受肉した存在であり、「行為する人格」にはかならない。そして身体こそは「行為的直観の器官」なのである。その意味で、西田は後期フッサールやメルロ＝ポンティの業績を知らなかったにもかかわらず、「身体への回帰」という現象学運動の流れに倅差していたとすることができる。そこで論者は行為的直観の概念を理解するために、二本の補助線を導入する。すなわち「リズムの現象学」と「状況的行為」の概念である。行為的直観は道具の使用に端的な実例を見出すことができるが、道具を十全に使いこなすためには、リズムカルな身体の動きを訓練によって習得することが不可欠である。言い換えれば、行為的直観とは事物と身体とをリズムにおいて一体化しつつ行為することなのである。また論者は認知科学における「状況的行為(situated action)」の概念を援用し、行為的直観が抽象的に思い描かれた「計画」に従った行為ではなく、特定の具体的コンテキスト(すなわち「場所」)に埋め込まれた状況的行為であることを明らかにする。そうした観点からすれば、行為する自己はすなわち「社会的・歴史的存在」であり、そこでは「我行為す、ゆえに我在り」と言わねばならない。

第6章「生命」では、西田の哲学的到達点とも言うべき「生命の哲学」の内実が明らかにされる。それによれば、西田の最晩年の境位は、従来の解釈のように宗教哲学にではなく、生命の哲学に見出されるべきなのである。まず論者は「生命」という概念が「いのち(life)」という名詞的側面と「生きる(to live)」という動詞的側面を併せ持つことを指摘し、西田の生命の哲学がこれら両側面に関わる考察であったことを強調する。西田が生命論において強い影響を受けたのはJ. S. ホールデーンの生物学であったが、ホールデーが生命の本質を生物と環境との「能動的維持」の関係に求めたことは、西田の「行為的直観」の概念と相即するものである。そこから西田の「矛盾的自己同一」の概念も、生と死(矛盾)が常に一つの有機体の中で統合されており、生体としての統一性が死にいたるまで保持され続ける生命の新陳代謝的作用になぞらえて解釈される。こうして西田の生命の哲学は、機械論と生氣論の対立を克服する「第三の立場」の提唱なのである。また、西田の論文のタイトルである「論理と生命」の関係についても、それは単なる「生命の論理」ではなく「生と死の論理」として理解されねばならない。すなわち、生は死の反対概念ではなく、西田の論理は生の中に必然的に死との関係を見出す「弁証法的論理」なのである。それは西洋の形式論理とは異なり、社会的・歴史的コンテキストにおける具体的知識に関わる思考の筋道を意味する。それゆえ、西田の生命の哲学は、晩年のフッサールが「生活世界」へと回帰したように、生と死を包含する日常世界の論理の探究、すなわち日常性の現象学の試みにかならないのである。

最後の第7章「西田の現象学的哲学の可能性と限界」において、論者はこれまでの考察を総括し、西田の哲学を「未完成の彫像」に喩えるとともに、彼の哲学的努力が唯物論と唯心論、機械論と生氣論、生と死、

西洋と東洋、さらには善と悪の対立さえも克服して「第三の立場」を提唱することに注がれていたことを改めて確認する。そうした成果の中には、西田を地球倫理やディープエコロジーの先駆者と見なしうるような潜在的可能性が秘められている。しかし、その上で論者は、西田が善と悪の対立をも論理によって克服しようとしたところにその限界を見て取る。すなわち、西田の哲学の中には、なぜ人を殺すことは悪であるのか、いかにして人間本性に内在する悪を克服するのかといった、倫理的問いに対する答えが欠落しているのである。そして論者は、こうした可能性と限界を批判的に追思考することの中にこそ、日本の哲学の将来がかかっていることを指摘して論を閉じる。

以上見てきたように、本論文は西田幾多郎の哲学を現象学的哲学という観点から読み解き、その潜在的可能性を明らかにするとともに、その限界をも見定めようとしたものである。考察の中には従来の西田解釈に修正を迫る論点や、今後の西田研究の指標となるべき創見も多く見ることができる。もちろん、「現象学」をどのように規定するか、果たして西田の哲学がその規定に合致するものであるか否かについては異論の余地もありえようが、それを含めて本論文が重要な問題提起を行い、今後の斯学の発展に寄与するものであることは疑いを容れない。

よって、本論文の提出者は、博士(文学)の学位を授与されるに十分な資格を有するものと認められる。